



The Second Foreign and Security Policy Opinion Poll in Greenland

Rasmus Leander Nielsen & Maria Ackrén



Ilisimatusarfik · University of Greenland



Authors: Rasmus Leander Nielsen & Maria Ackrén, Nasiffik / Ilisimatusarfik
Partners: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung & EPINION
Copyright: © Authors & Ilisimatusarfik, December 2024
ISBN/EAN: ISBN: 978-87-90197-26-1. EAN: 9788790197261
Graphics: Wowern Reklame

Disclaimer: Any views expressed in this publication are those of the authors. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the University of Greenland or Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. The text may not be used in part or in full without citing the authors: Nielsen, Rasmus Leander & Maria Ackrén (2024). *The Second Foreign and Security Policy Opinion Poll in Greenland*. Nuuk: Nasiffik / Ilisimatusarfik (University of Greenland)

Address: **Nasiffik – Centre for Foreign & Security Policy**
Ilisimatusarfik (University of Greenland)
Manutooq 1
Postbox 1061
3905 Nuussuaq
Greenland
<https://uk.uni.gl/research/nasiffik-centre-for-foreign-security-policy/>

The Second Foreign and Security Policy Opinion Poll in Greenland

Rasmus Leander Nielsen, Associate Professor, Ilisimatusarfik (University of Greenland)

Maria Ackrén, Professor, Ilisimatusarfik (University of Greenland)

Introduction

Nasiffik – Centre for Foreign & Security Policy at Ilisimatusarfik (University of Greenland) has conducted a public opinion poll amongst a representative sample of the Greenlandic population on foreign and security policy issues in spring 2024. It is the second survey of its kind after a similar survey report was published in 2021. The data-collection was done by EPINION in Denmark (cf. appendix about methods). The survey is funded by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Stockholm, Sweden, Greenland Research Council, Nuuk, Greenland, and Nasiffik at Ilisimatusarfik, Nuuk, Greenland.

Since we published a similar survey in 2021,¹ Arctic governance has been severely challenged by the ongoing war in Ukraine. The world has witnessed a more turbulent time in relation to security issues; in consequence, international relations have come further to the fore. Some spillover effects from Russia's (re-)invasion of Ukraine also have regional ramifications in the Arctic. The work in the Arctic Council came to a pause during the Russian chairship in March 2022 and has only very slowly been restored during the Norwegian chairship with online meetings in the working groups including some tentative Russian participation.

Naalakkersuisut (the Government of Greenland) took an early decision in consensus with the 'like-minded states' decision to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine and therefore the cooperation with Russia has been put on hold.² The Kingdom of Denmark is taking over the chairship of the Arctic Council in spring 2025 and Greenland has been adamant in playing a key role, as the only country of the Kingdom located in the Arctic.

In February 2024, Naalakkersuisut published a strategy on foreign, security, and defense policy, which demonstrates an orientation towards more cooperation towards especially the North American Arctic. The US is seen as a natural shelter country in relation to defense and security based on the long historical ties with the Pituffik Space Base (formerly the Thule Air Base) as the only operating American base in the country.³

-
1. Ackrén Maria & Rasmus Leander Nielsen (2021). *The First Foreign and Security Policy Opinion Poll in Greenland*. Nuuk: Nasiffik / Ilisimatusarfik. Cf. Nielsen, Rasmus Leander & Maria Ackrén (2021). Grønlandernes holdninger til udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitiske spørgsmål: indsigter fra en survey. *Økonomi & Politik*, 94(2), pp. 84-98.
 2. Udenrigspolitisk redegørelse 2023 (Foreign policy report 2023). Naalakkersuisut: Departementet for selvstændighed og udenrigsanliggender. Available at: https://ina.gl/media/xtbopll/pkt14_fm2024_udenrigspolitisk_redegoerelse_2023_da.pdf
 3. *Greenland in the world – Nothing about us without us. Greenland's Foreign, Security and Defense Policy 2024-2033 – An Arctic Strategy*. February 2024. Naalakkersuisut/Government of Greenland: Ministry of Statehood and Foreign Affairs.

The Faroe Islands also adopted a new national and security strategy in April 2024. Both strategies see NATO as the overall security umbrella to protect the territories within the Kingdom of Denmark.⁴

In what follows, this survey-based report highlights the main similarities and differences between our two datasets from 2021 and 2024. We discuss the main findings and temporal comparative aspects and developments. In addition, spatially, we will also include some comparative findings on specific variables in recent, similar survey-reports from Iceland and the Faroe Islands.

Three years have passed since our first survey, which might not be that long, but the international scene has, as already mentioned, changed drastically within this period with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, increasing intensity of violence in the Middle East, problems with cooperation in the Arctic Council and amongst Indigenous Peoples of the North, expansion of NATO to include Sweden and Finland, and a changing global economy. Since the landscape of international relations can shift swiftly, we might also expect that opinions among the population can vary in relation to such a short period as well.

In the following sections, the dissemination of the data is structured under the umbrella of four main topics: 1) threat perception; 2) international cooperation; 3) views on Great Powers (i.e., US, China and Russia); and 4) military and basic training in emergency preparedness. This division follows the logic of going from the more general issues towards more specific and local ones.

Threat perception and main challenges to the Greenlandic society


As in 2021, when asked which are the three most vital challenges towards the Greenlandic society, Greenlanders' answers show that it is primarily items related to everyday lives rather than geopolitical concerns that are in focus. We see that higher living costs (24.4%), the economic situation (16.4%), and unemployment (11.5%) are the most urgent challenges for the Greenlandic society. The same three issues were identified as most pressing in 2021, although in a different order: the economic situation scored (19.5%), unemployment (17.2%), and higher living costs (16.6%) (see figure 1).

In a similar survey undertaken in Iceland, we see the same tendencies: also here the economic situation is scoring highest, then higher living costs, while climate change and environment lies in third place.⁵ Covid-19 was still omnipresent when we conducted the 2021 survey, but now the pandemic already seems mostly forgotten, whereas crime is mentioned by more respondents (from 2.7% to 6.3%) and cyber-attacks is a new item with 3.7% mentioning this, perhaps gaining salience after several institutions experienced ransomware attacks in the last couple of years, including the Government and the hospital sector. Immigration is another item that is increasing in salience and may gain further traction in response to increasing immigration to Greenland, especially from the Philippines. The geopolitical items of interest in the Arctic and military threats to the Arctic remain low on the list with only minor differences compared to the 2021-survey.

4. Skorini, Heini (2024). *The Faroe Islands and International Relations: Mapping Public Opinion in the Faroe Islands on Security and Foreign Affairs*. Tórshavn: Faculty of History and Social Sciences, University of the Faroe Islands, p. 15.


5. Omarsdóttir, Silja Bara (2023). *Leaning into Cooperation: Changes of Icelanders' Perspectives on International Politics after Russia's Invasion of Ukraine*. Reykjavik: Institute of International Affairs, University of Iceland, p. 5.

Figure 1: Main Challenges in Greenland



Asked the more specific question about how one perceives the security threats, most Greenlanders do not seem to be too concerned (see figure 2). 30.4% of the respondents say that the security threats are low, while 22.4% see them as normal or as they used to be. However, 28.2% evaluate the security threats as being 'high', which is a change from 2021, where only 17.7% had the same opinion. In 2021, few answered 'very high', and this has dropped by almost half (from 6.4% to 3.5%). The number of respondents who perceive it as 'very low' has also (slightly) increased, meaning the biggest change is a substantial decrease for the 'normal' category.

Figure 2: Perceived Security Threats



In sum, there is a slight increase in the sentiment of a more insecure Arctic, but still on a low level of less than one-third perceiving the security threat as 'very high' or 'high'. In relation to the Icelandic study, we see that Icelanders also score low on this item. About 40% of Icelanders do not perceive any threats towards Iceland, about 38% perceive a medium threat and about 22% a high threat. The scale is different in the Icelandic study, but it confirms that the perception within the North Atlantic is that there are limited security threats in this region.⁶

International cooperation

In 2023, a Greenlandic diplomat was sent to the NATO headquarters in Brussels within the Danish permanent representation; formally, a part of the Danish diplomatic delegation, but seconded and partially funded by Naalakkersuisut. This was to signal that security and defense matters had become prioritized and because of the turbulent international situation⁷. Greenland has therefore more insight into what is happening within the NATO framework and can contribute with knowledge about the Arctic region and its people.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

7. *Udenrigspolitisk redegørelse 2023* (Foreign policy report 2023). Ministry of Statehood and Foreign Affairs. Naalakkersuisut: Government of Greenland, p. 11.

On the 14th of June 2022, Greenland, Canada, and Denmark signed an agreement to delimit the maritime boundaries and land border between Greenland and Canada on and around Tartupaluk (Hans Island). This ended a long diplomatic dispute over the sovereignty of the island.⁸ This is the first land border that Greenland has with a foreign power.

Both the new Greenland's Foreign, Security and Defense Policy 2024-2033 and the foreign policy report from 2023 emphasize cooperation towards the West (North America), but also to the Far East (Asia). Iceland as the closest neighbour is also mentioned as one of the most important partners within international cooperation.⁹ As mentioned in the introduction, the Arctic Council has been severely challenged in the years leading up to the Kingdom of Denmark's anticipated chairship in May 2025, with the assumption that Greenland will play a key role.

When we asked with whom Greenlanders would like to cooperate more or less with, with a pre-defined list of different states and organizations/fora, the same 'Arctic Axis' as in 2021 emerges, i.e. the Arctic Council, Iceland, and Canada. Iceland scores highest with 80.6%, followed closely by Canada 79.9%, and the Arctic Council 79% (see figure 3).¹⁰ If we compare this to the 2021-survey, we see that Iceland was then 90%, Arctic Council 87%, and Canada 85.2%. Hence, Greenlanders identify the same countries and organization as preferred cooperation partners, but enthusiasm for cooperation in general is a lower.

If we compare this with the Icelandic case we see a totally different scenario, in which Icelanders identify the Nordic countries (including Greenland) as the preferred partners, scoring almost 75%, followed by the EU with 50% and Germany in third place with about 35%.¹¹

The countries with which Greenlanders would cooperate less are Russia (69.3%) and China (55.4%). The top two countries for less cooperation were the same in 2021, but unwillingness to cooperate with Russia and China has increased from 58.4% and 46.6% respectively since the 2021 study. In Iceland, we see that also Russia and China are identified as least likely partners in international cooperation.¹² The same tendency seems to be at hand in Iceland when it comes to the perception of Russia and China.

8. Lackenbauer, P. Whitney & Rasmus Leander Nielsen (2022). "Close, like-minded partners committed to democratic principles": Settling the Hans Island/Tartupaluk Territorial Dispute', *Arctic Yearbook*, Vol. 11, pp. 357-367.

9. See op cit. footnote 2-3. See also the "Declaration of Cooperation" with Iceland. Available at:


<https://www.stjornarradid.is/library/01-Frettatengt-myndir-og-skrar/FOR/Fylgiskjol-i-frett/Samstarfsyfir%C3%BDsing%20Gr%C3%A6nlands%20og%20C3%8Dslands.pdf>

10. Nielsen, Rasmus Leander & Maria Ackrén (2021). Grønlandernes holdninger til udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitiske spørgsmål: indsigter fra en survey. *Økonomi & Politik*, 94(2), 84-98.

11. Omarsdóttir, Silja Bara (2023). *Leaning into Cooperation: Changes of Icelanders' Perspectives on International Politics after Russia's Invasion of Ukraine*. Reykjavik: Institute of International Affairs, University of Iceland, p. 11.

12. Ibid, p. 11.

Figure 3: Cooperation with Other Countries and Organizations



In addition, there was an open option to add to the predefined list, but no suggestions received more than 0.1% support. These included the Faroe Islands, the Nordic Council, Norway, the UN, and the UN's office of Indigenous Peoples in New York.

Another question asked about how Greenland should act within security policy and alliances. This question was tweaked from the 2021 version to be more specific. In 2021, 56.7% stated that Greenland should follow its own interests, whereas 43.3% preferred to see Greenland cooperate with current alliances. The alternative way of asking this has altered the result substantially with now NATO by far being the most popular answer. Most Greenlanders see NATO as the best organization for security (44.3%), followed by the US (18.8%), and on third place the EU and European countries (15.6%) (see figure 4).

Figure 4: Security alliances





Figure 5: NATO as a positive or negative alliance



However, the general positive sentiment towards NATO has diminished from our previous survey, albeit from a high level in 2021, it should be stressed (see figure 5). NATO is still seen as an overwhelming popular alliance, with 65.1% seeing it as a positive alliance, down from 75.5% in 2021. The neutral 'neither positive nor negative' answers absorb most of the difference (roughly 10 percentage points increase), whereas the negative sentiment alternative is still very low with a slight increase by 1 percentage point from 2021 to now 3.8%.

If we compare this with the Faroe Islands and Iceland, we see that both countries see NATO as a positive organization of over 60% in both instances.¹³ These figures have increased since 2020 from earlier surveys in these countries. Hence, it seems that Greenland has moved to the same level as the Faroe Islands and Iceland regarding this question, but from a reverse point of departure.

Another significant intergovernmental organization for Greenland is the European Union (EU). Greenland left the EU (then EC) in the mid-1980s and has since been an Overseas Country and Territory (OCT). The OCT framework concerning former European colonies and autonomous regions within Member States has existed since the Treaty of Rome in 1957. It provides Greenland with direct access to EU programs in addition to some bilateral agreements with the Union. The relationships with the EU include iterative fisheries agreements, partnership agreements regarding education and recently green growth, including mineral resources, as the third main pillar.¹⁴ When asking the Greenlanders about if they would like to rejoin the EU, we saw in 2021 that most Greenlanders (60%) would vote for 'no' if a new referendum was convened, while the rest would vote 'yes' (40%). The new data, somewhat surprisingly, shows a reverse outcome of 60% now indicating they would vote 'yes' to rejoin the EU, with 40% voting 'no' (see figure 6). However, the 'don't knows' are omitted from figure 6 and almost one out of five (19%) stated this option, which means a large group of voters are undecided, do not have sufficient information, or do not see this as a salient issue, etc.


The data collection was made in spring 2024, during the time of the opening of a new EU-office in Nuuk and visit by the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, in mid-March to officially open the office, which spurred some local media attention. If we compare this with the Faroe Islands, we see that most Faroese would vote 'no' (46%) and only 27% would vote 'yes'. However as in the Greenlandic case, many Faroese are undecided with 27% of 'don't knows'.¹⁵

13. See Skorini, Heini (2024). *The Faroe Islands and International Relations: Mapping Public Opinion in the Faroe Islands on Security and Foreign Affairs*. Tórshavn: Faculty of History and Social Sciences, University of the Faroe Islands, p. 9 and Omarsdóttir, Silja Bara (2023). *Leaning into Cooperation: Changes of Icelanders' Perspectives on International Politics after Russia's Invasion of Ukraine*. Reykjavik: Institute of International Affairs, University of Iceland, p. 19.

14. *Udenrigspolitik reddegørelse 2023* (Foreign policy report 2023). Ministry of Statehood and Foreign Affairs. Naalakkersuisut: Government of Greenland, p. 33.

15. Skorini, Heini (2024). *The Faroe Islands and International Relations: Mapping Public Opinion in the Faroe Islands on Security and Foreign Affairs*. Tórshavn: Faculty of History and Social Sciences, University of the Faroe Islands, p. 22.

Figure 6: Referendum on Rejoining the EU




A lot of Greenland's international cooperation is directed at commercial foreign policy, including export of fish and seafood and attracting investments. In 2021, 27% of Greenlanders were very positive towards Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) (27%), while 31.1% were positive and a large proportion of the population was both positive and negative (30.6%). In that survey only a small percentage were negative (4.9%) or very negative (1.4%) (see figure 7). In our new survey from 2024, only 3.8% of the Greenlanders are very positive. However, the percentages for positive are still high at 33.4%. The group of the population that is both positive and negative has increased, since the latest survey, to 41.8%. The percentage for negative attitudes towards FDI is at 12.2% and very negative at 2%.

The changes from the last survey until now might be explained by the new challenges of the global economy, but also the lack of investment in areas that Greenlanders had expectations of development and economic diversification, for example, mineral exploration and exploitation. However, with the new expanded airports in Nuuk and Ilulissat and a brand new airport in Qaqortoq, there is much optimism that tourism will become a significant economic sector in Greenland in which FDI might play a part. New airline operators have already shown interest in flying directly between Nuuk and Copenhagen (SAS) and between Nuuk and New York (United Airlines).¹⁶ A few mining projects could start in the foreseeable future and the abovementioned green growth program with the EU could spur investments in Greenland's environmental preservation, digital and energy transitions, and critical raw materials value chains.

16. Sermitsiaq, 18 September 2024 and 19 October 2024: <https://www.sermitsiaq.ag/samfund/sas-vender-tilbage-til-gronland-maske/2137879>; <https://www.sermitsiaq.ag/erhverv/verdens-storste-flyelskab-til-nuuk/2149514>

Figure 7: FDI in Greenland



Greenland and the superpowers

Greenland and Great Power rivalry has gained quite a lot of attention over the years. As mentioned above, the war in Ukraine has made geopolitics more conflictual, complicating Arctic governance through trusted institutions like the Arctic Council. In this section, we consider Greenlanders' views on Russia, the US, and especially China (cf. also the earlier discussion of figure 3 and 4).


American military presence in Greenland dates back to WWII and the early Cold War years during which several bases around Greenland were built. Today, of the US bases, only the Pituffik Space Base, formerly known as Thule Air Base, remains operational. 20 years ago, the Igaliku-agreement was signed between Greenland, Denmark, and the US. It is only slowly being implemented, mostly in recent years, in terms of cooperation regarding education, tourism, and mining, etc., and trade is basically non-existent. The US Consulate in the capital of Nuuk soon has 5-years anniversary and meetings in e.g., the Joint Committee again take place on a regularly basis after service contract issues in Pituffik were solved a few years ago.

As an earlier section in this report revealed, when the Greenlandic population is asked about whether they prefer more or less cooperation with the USA, less than 60% answer that they would like to see more cooperation (cf. figure 3). One of the most noteworthy results in our 2021-surveys was that the Greenlandic population would like to see a clear standpoint towards

USA in relation to foreign and security policy. Back then, 52.6% of the Greenlandic population would have preferred to see a clear standpoint, while 37.9% would like better economic relation with the US, whereas the new data shows that this binary option has evened out with a small majority now indicating they weigh economic ties (41.9%) over security policy (40.5%) (see figure 8).

As mentioned in relation to figure 3, China (24.7%) and especially Russia (12.4%) are the countries Greenlanders are least enthusiastic to cooperate with more. In relation to Russia and the changes in-between our two surveys, Greenlanders would still like to see a clear standpoint towards foreign- and security policy, 47.4% compared to 59% in the 2021-survey, while only 20.3%, down from 24.9%, are in favor of good economic relations. A sizeable number of almost a third (32.3%), however, are answering 'don't know' (see figure 8). The share of 'don't know' has increased for all three great powers (cf. methods appendix).

Figure 8: China, the US, and Russia compared



It would have been interesting to have survey-data in closer proximity in timing to the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in February 2022. Aside from the period immediately following the expanded invasion in 2022, there is surprisingly little domestic debate about Russia in the Greenlandic and

public fora. Occasionally, Russian military bases and submarines in the GIUK-gap or close to the Greenlandic east coast are discussed. The war and the ramifications in for e.g. the Arctic Council have been covered by local media, but to a lesser extent over time. Greenland and Russia did have some bilateral agreements in relation to the fishing industry and cooperation, but the abovementioned halt of trade relations was far less important to the economy as compared to e.g. the Faroese case.

The Faroe Islands thus has much more interaction with Russia, both in terms of exports and annual fisheries agreements since 1977. Having a tough attitude towards Russia on foreign policy and security issues amongst the Faroese went from 39% in 2021 to 51% in 2024, whereas those who preferred economic relations went from 46% to 27% in those three years ('don't know' is 14% in 2021 and 23% in 2024). In Iceland, we saw an even more substantial change regarding relations with Russia, as the number of the population who wanted a tough attitude towards Russia on foreign policy issues went from 21.9% in 2020 to 85.2% in 2023, while those prioritizing good economic relations plummeted from 78.1% in 2020 to 14.8% in 2023¹⁷.

Another interesting finding in our 2021 survey was that the binary option depicted in figure 8 was the reverse case to the abovementioned US relations compared to China. Then, we argued that China vis-à-vis the US preferences were not as counterintuitive as one might think, as Greenland annually export a substantial amount of fish and seafood to China and was about to open a representation in Beijing¹⁸. This has evened out in the 2024-survey with still a minor majority prioritizing good economic relations (38.6%) over signalling a clear standpoint in security relations (36.2%) (25.2% 'don't know').

Chinese ambitions to become more influential in the Arctic region, as a self-proclaimed "near-Arctic state", are not currently manifested in Greenland as there are currently no major projects in Greenland involving Chinese partners. Regarding the question if Greenland should pursue the same policy as the USA in relation to China, Greenlanders are still exceedingly reluctant to follow American policy blindly. Only 20.5% favour taking the same policy as the USA, a minor increase from our 2021 survey, while 79.5% are against Greenland following the US's policy towards China (see figure 9). This distribution of answers is roughly unchanged from 2021, as ca. 4 out of 5 state that Greenland should not just follow the US's policy towards China. Asked if Greenland should follow its own policy towards China a vast majority of 57.3% say 'yes', with 18.5% answering 'no' and 24.2% 'don't know' (see figure 10).

17. See Skorini, Heini (2024). *The Faroe Islands and International Relations: Mapping Public Opinion in the Faroe Islands on Security and Foreign Affairs*. Tórshavn: Faculty of History and Social Sciences, University of the Faroe Islands, p. 17, and Omarsdóttir, Silja Bara (2023). *Learning into Cooperation: Changes of Icelanders' Perspectives on International Politics after Russia's Invasion of Ukraine*. Reykjavik: Institute of International Affairs, University of Iceland, p. 12.

18. Nielsen, Rasmus Leander & Maria Ackrén (2021). Grønlandernes holdninger til udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitiske spørgsmål: indsigter fra en survey. *Økonomi & Politik*, 94(2), pp. 84-98.

Figure 9: USA's Policy Towards China





Figure 10: Greenland's own policy towards China



42.2% of the Greenlanders see China's increasing influence in the world as a positive thing, down from 52.8% in 2021, whereas 57.6% see it as a negative thing (see figure 11). Regarding investments from China, the Greenlandic population is still hesitant with now almost 3 out of 4 answering Greenland should protect its economy from Chinese FDI, i.e. only 25.5% (32.2% in 2021) say yes to Chinese investments, while 74.5 (67.8% in 2021) say no thanks to foreign investments from China (see figure 12).

Figure 11: *China's Influence in the World*






Figure 12: *Investments from China*



Military and Basic Training in Emergency Preparedness

When in 2021 we asked if Greenland should have its own military, the vast majority of 70% stated 'no'. This has slightly dropped to 63%, but still a majority of the population do not think Greenland should build its own army. Few Greenlanders have served in the Danish military, including the Sirius Dog Sled Patrol in Northeastern Greenland, but there is increasingly focus on defense policy and the balance between military defense, surveillance, and civilian and dual use capabilities in Greenland.¹⁹ In addition, there have been recent discussions if Greenland in the future should have its own coast guard, akin to e.g. Iceland, a member of NATO with no standing army, and in the current Danish system, the Joint Arctic is both civilian and part of the military in contrast to most other coast guards.

Figure 13: Own Military?




The only brand new thematic topic added to the 2024-survey is related to a recent Arctic Basic Training program in Kangerlussuaq (Sdr. Strømfjord in Danish), with the first batch of ca. 20 students starting 5 May 2024. It is an emergency preparedness school developed and offered by JACO, which is part of the Danish Defense, but in close collaboration with Greenlandic and local authorities in Qeqqata municipality. Asked if one could consider taking this new education, 26% answers 'yes', which is fairly high number. If we include only younger people from 18 to 34, as is the main target of the program, the number increases to 33.5% (58,1% 'no', 8.5% 'don't know').

¹⁹ *Greenland in the world – Nothing about us without us. Greenland's Foreign, Security and Defense Policy 2024-2033 – An Arctic Strategy.* February 2024. Naalakkersuisut/Government of Greenland: Ministry of Statehood and Foreign Affairs.

The Basic Training program includes indigenous knowledge as a key part to promote skills in emergency preparedness, including SAR, and the hope is that these experiences can provide utility in e.g. Greenland's smaller towns and settlements in relation to natural disasters, SAR, maritime issues amid climate change, etc. The students can continue their education in the Danish defense, the police, or fire department, etc. Over time, the education could eventually include more coast guard training, as well, and future research should follow how this education develops and arguably include comparative experiences from e.g. Iceland and especially Canada.

Figure 14: *New Basic Training Education*



Appendix: Methods and Data

The data in the opinion poll is based on telephone interviews conducted by EPINION, using Greenlandic speaking phoners, with a representative sample drawn from the Greenlandic population (N = 702). The questions are mostly the same we posed in the previous survey in 2021. In the 2021 survey, questions were formulated by the authors with inspiration from a similar survey conducted by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)²⁰ with some additions and deletions for relevance in Greenland.

Participants were at least 18 years of age. The survey contained 16 questions and some background variables. Some of the previously used in 2021 background variables were omitted this time, a few questions were also excluded, one question about security alliances was tweaked to be more precise and there are a few new questions, e.g. about a new Arctic Basic Training education.

The dataset is slightly weighted by EPINON, to even out minor oversampling of e.g. men, but in general is representative of the whole Greenlandic population on all the common background variables (age, gender, place of residence, etc.). The statistical margin of error is between 2.5-3% at a 95% confidence interval.

The data-collection for the 2021-survey was conducted by HS Analyse in Nuuk, but the only local polling institute closed in the meantime, and, alas, was not an option for the second round of the iterative surveys. Hence, there might be some 'in-house' discrepancies between the two polling institutes for which we cannot control. In general, we have more 'don't know' answers in the new survey to some of the questions compared to 2021.

Similar survey-reports from Iceland and the Faroe Islands have since been published, making it possible to do comparisons, although the methodology, questions, exact wording, and scales differ from survey to survey across the North Atlantic.

In sum, we have tried to prioritize the time-series purpose of the data-collection from 2021 to 2024 and thus apply the same set up as much as possible, with these caveats in mind and ensuring that the survey questions remain pertinent.

20. See Svendsen Ø. & Weltzien, Å. (2020), 'Norwegians Adapting to a Changing World', NUPI Report nr. 9/2020. Afterwards similar surveys have been conducted in the Faroe Islands and Iceland, also twice both places (refs.)

ISBN: 978-87-90197-26-1

EAN: 9788790197261



Ilisimatusarfik • University of Greenland